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harmed."6 Furthermore, the Court stated that "simply because the physical damage to . . .  Catalyst's 
facility has been repaired by removal of the barge without cost to Catalyst does not mean that no 
physical damage occurred by the intrusion."7 In reaching its decision the Court relied on Consolidated 
Aluminum Corp. v. Bean Corp. ,8 where the Fifth Circuit held, "harm resulting from the interruption of 
the gas supply to [Plaintiff' s] facility satisfied Testabank. "9 Much like the disruption to the flow of gas 
in Consolidated, the Catalyst Court found the blockage of water to the Plaintiffs facility also satisfied 
Testabank. 
The Court further found that Catalyst's voluntary reduction of its turbines, to prevent additional 
damage to its facility, may also be used to satisfy the Testabank rule. The Court stated that "[a]cts taken 
in mitigation to prevent permanent physical damage can serve as the physical damage requirement in the 
Testabank rule."10 Without mitigating potential damage, Catalyst would have run the "unacceptable" 
risk of incurring physical damage to its hydroelectric station. By applying the rule set forth by this 
Court in Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp. , 11 such reduction of power would 
be enough to satisfy the requisite damage requirement, despite the fact that there was no lasting physical 
damage to the facility or intake channel after the removal of the barge was completed. 
For the above stated reasons the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the judgment of the 
district court. 
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UNDER ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ENDORSEMENT POLICIES NAMED AND ANY 
ADDITIONAL INSUREDS ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME BENEFITS AND RESTRICTIONS 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellee, f"mding that the Protection and 
Indemnity Clause and the Alternative Employment Endorsement Clause were not conflicting and 
thus, SNIC was not awarded reimbursement for their defense costs 
Cal-Dive International, Inc. v. Seabright Insurance Company 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 
627 F.3d 110 
(Decided November 22, 201 0) 
This case involves an insurance policy coverage dispute. Coastal Catering, LLC ("Coastal") and Horizon 
Offshore Contractors, Inc. ("Horizon") entered into a catering services agreement. David Brown, a Coastal 
employee, was injured while aboard a Horizon vessel. Brown brought a Jones Act lawsuit, naming Coastal and 
Horizon as co-defendants. Under the terms of their business contract, Coastal was obligated to defend Horizon 
through plaintiff-appellee State National Insurance Company ("SNIC"), its Maritime General Liability ("MGL") 
insurer. Coastal defended itself through defendant-appellant Seabright Insurance Company ("Seabright"), its 
Maritime Employer's Liability ("MEL") insurer. After the underlying case settled, SNIC and Seabright divided 
the defense costs fifty-fifty, and SNIC sought reimbursement. 
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Seabright's  policy excluded coverage if its insured maintained a Protection and Indemnity Clause 
("P&I"). Citing this policy, Seabright refused to reimburse SNIC because Horizon' s  P&I absolved them from a 
duty to defend. SNIC maintained that Seabright' s  Alternative Employment Endorsement Clause ("AEE"), which 
guaranteed coverage to "borrowed employees," did not absolve them of their duty to defend. SNIC argued that 
the AEE policy extended only to the named insured, Coastal, and not any additional insureds, such as Horizon. 
Accordingly, SNIC brought suit to compel Seabright to reimburse them. The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana found the AEE and P&I policies were mutually exclusive, and granted SNIC' s  
motion for summary judgment. Seabright appealed. 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law. 1 State law 
governs the interpretation of a marine policy of insurance. In this case, Louisiana law applied because the 
insurance policy was drafted and executed in Louisiana.2 Absent ambiguity, Louisiana law applies a plain 
meaning doctrinal interpretation when construing contracts.3 
Relying on Landerman v. Liberty Services, the Court held that even if the AEE triggered Seabright's  duty 
to defend, the P&I nonetheless excluded coverage. In Landerman, the plaintiff, like Brown, was injured while 
working on a vessel owned by an entity other than his payroll employer.4 Like SNIC, the additional insured 
argued that the AEE did not apply to them, but the Court found otherwise. Similarly here, the Court held that 
SNIC ' s  reliance on the AEE was misplaced. Consistent with their holding in Landerman, the Court determined 
that when AEE policies add additional insureds, the additional insureds enjoy the same benefits and are subject to 
the same restrictions as a named insured absent policy language to the contrary.5 Thus, the P&I applied to 
Horizon. In addition, the Court held that the P&I and AEE were not conflicting, and refused to ignore the clear 
precedent. Applying a "plain meaning" interpretation of Horizon's policy the Court reversed the district court and 
held in favor of Seabright. 
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